R05 WarFabric
The current situation with the deployment of Russian forces on Ukrainian soil can serve as a model for similar military operations, where a dominant foreign force invades a defensive in-country force. In such a scenario, there are generally five likely outcomes:
- Short War - Dominant force brings to theatre overwhelming military capability; potentially artillery and airstrikes are extended for use against non-military targets; acheives air superiority, allowing freedom of manoeuvre; targets key national infrastructure, energy supplies, comms networks to degrade the sitting adminisation's ability to keep practical control. Succeeds in capitulation of the sitting gov and installs a friendly administration. National resistance would largely disperse into irregular small groups with little or no centralised control or logistics, with any surviving rump government working from abroad to rally support.
- Long War - Dominant force gets bogged down in the logisitically difficult task of fielding an occupation force for sustained periods, in the face of motivated armed resistance groups, largely irregular but without clear centralised control.
- Wider War - a partially successful national campaign by the dominant force encourages them to push the area of conflict into neighbouring areas. Possibly, the provision of aid to defensive force is considered active aggression, warranting limited escalation. Similar to (2) Long War, with extended footprint.
- Diplomatic Solution - Both parties consider a non-military solution as being in their interests, and agree to talks. Territory currently held is maintained and solidified. International debate continues as to the long term normalisation of relations while accepting en passant the anexation or balkanization of the target country. Limitted and asymetric warfare continued by national irregular forces.
- Decapitation or defenestration of the premier of the dominant force - out of scope.
In outcome (1), (2) and (3), and possibly to a lesser extent (4), there will be a need for a communications and coordination fabric for irregular forces to leverage their asymetric advantage.
The main characteristic of asymetric warfare is that the dominant force has centralised Command and Control, most likely well-developed logistics including the rotation of forces; they can deploy sophisticated materiel in theatre and may have freedom of manoeuvre within the battlespace. Whereas, the subordinate force has eclectic capabilities, is dispersed, does not have clear command and control lines, does not have freedom of manoeuvre and may not enjoy reliable logistics.
In such as battlefield, asymetric forces may nevertheless have the advantage against the dominant force. A regular force under doctrinal control can be anticipated in mode of operation (although not necessary in deployment tactics); a smaller irregular force has no preferred doctrinal control, and therefore is difficult to anticipate. The more dissimilar the opponent, the more difficult it is to anticipate his actions. An opponent without doctrinal control cannot be practically anticipated.
However, short of descending to loosely associated individual operational cells, asymetric forces still need a method to coordinate, inform, communcate and prioritise.
This system is intended as a tool to allow that to happen.
Strategic Intent​
The system is intended to support an irregular force in asymetric warfare against an occupying force. The system is to provide decentralised C3 (Command, Control, Communications), and by implication Resource Procurement and Allocation (Logistics) to the irregular force. It needs to operate in a manner which allows for the prioritisation of resources, efficiency of their use, their deployment on specific tactical objectives while anticipating the potential modes of failure and their consequences, and the robustness of the overall system in the face of both success and failure.
Tactical Intent​
In order to meet the Strategic Intent, the system must cover each of the three points on C3, but without the need for a centralised command centre or deployed/secure communications network. Breaking these down, the system requires:
- Communication: Robust and secure comms - the message always gets through.
- This may be through an API to existing (e.g. Telegram) or new messaging system. Aim is to support the following tactical intents through secure comms that are likely to be disrupted, and which therefore prioritise the message getting through over speed of message delivery. By analogy, traditional comms is UDP-like. Asymetric comms needs to be TCP-like.
- Command: Request Submission
- A method for submitting targets of opportunity, and targets to be avoided, with meta data on how reliable the information received is.
- Command: Request QA
- A method for others to comment on, promote or deter targets referred to in (2).
- A method for signing off on an operation to proceed, within given parameters, where 'signing off' is decentralised.
- Command: Target Prioritisation
- Given an approved Request, a method to allow private groups and inter-groups to manage finite resources. Ie having a list of QA'd targets/objectives, not all need to be/should be/can be carried out in parallel. This is the strategic level of coordination.
- Control: Situational Awareness
- A method for condensing decisions that have passed QA into a tactical map or data representation that informs others in their future Requests at (2)
- Control: Target Identification
- A method to practically collate information on the target or objective from others, once that target/objective has passed QA. This is to allow for disparate groups to coordinate effectively.
- Control: Operation Assessment
- A method to disperse the results from an operation, to inform operations still in the queue, to receive feedback and to prioritise that feedback based on reputation.
- Logistics: NFT non-combatant contribution
- A method for non-combatants to request (2), promote (4) and support (5) operations while providing supporting funds in exchange for NFTs for that operation.
- Logisitics: Combatant Reputation.
- A method to update the Reputation of participants through (2-7) based on outcomes and assessed by peers.
Detailed Description​
Tactical Intent 1: Communication: Robust and secure comms - the message always gets through.​
In support of the basic necessity to communicate, consider and execute on plans, there is a basic requirement for a secure comms channel, that being:
Must​
- Provide an accessible comms channel that is available to a majority of the irregular troops, without any requirement for training or additional equipment.
- Provide secure communication between those on the comms network, in that intercepted comms cannot practically be read, albeit network analysis may show interactions and concentrations of interactions.
Should​
- Be deployable with equipment that is already in the possession of the irregular force.
Could​
- Allow sub-groups to be set up and removed, as required by the tactical situation.
Must Not​
- Allow data recovery of communications or the operation of the system from captured equipment.
Tactical Intent 2: Command: Request Submission​
The first duty of command is to identify what can be done, ie what opportunities are available to the irregular force to further their strategic aim. In a decentralised C3, identifying opportunities must likewise be decentralised. This aspect of the system must cater for that identification of opportunity:
Must​
- Allow the submission of tactical opportunities in sufficient detail as to allow others to assess their worth, and comment on the tactical plan.
- Provide a method for marking those submissions with additional information as to whether or not it should proceed. (NB, this is the basic requirement - minimally "For the avoidance of fuck-ups".)
Should​
- Provide a method for more detailed interaction with the wider force, to allow for timing and resource coordination, concentration of force and "Red Team" analysis (ie, antogonist analysis of what failure modes are possible.)
Could​
- Provide a method of weight voting based on multiple metrics, e.g. previous reputation of those providing an opinion, location and motability of resources, resource levels, time since previous deployment, potential tactical and strategic value.
Must not​
- Allow Byzantine submissions, or DOS submissions, to crowd out genuine requests.